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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the Mergers & Acquisitions scenario of the Indian Financial Services Sector. The 
data for eighty cases of M&A in the period from March 1993- Feb 2010 is collected for a set of ten 
financial parameters representing the various characteristics of a firm. All the cases have been analyzed 
individually and collectively to determine the overall effects of M&A in the industry.  The results of the 
study indicate that PAT and PBDITA have been positively affected after the merger but the liquidity 
condition represented by Current Ratio has deteriorated. Also Cost Efficiency and Interest Coverage have 
improved and deteriorated in equal number of cases. Interest Coverage remains an important factor in 
determining the return on shareholders‟ funds both before and after the merger but Profit Margin also 
becomes important after the merger. And looking at the diversification effects of merger, in two out of 
the three cases there has been a reduction in total and systematic risk. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity is broadly driven by larger economic themes as 
companies reconfigure their strategic initiatives to match macro events and adjust to externalities that 
change the dynamics of their value chain or competitive landscape. If we were to trace M&A activity 
throughout history, we can observe such themes. As there building efforts started after World War II, 
M&A activity was driven by the need for business entities to achieve economies of scale, both from a 
geographical and product offerings perspective. In addition, the theme of “diversification” gave impetus 
to business entities acquiring businesses outside of their direct focus so as to mitigate the impact of the 
economy on their business portfolio. This trend gave rise to conglomerates for which acquiring disparate 
businesses was a stated growth strategy. 
Indian enterprises were subject to a strict control regime before 1990s. This had led to the 
haphazard growth of Indian corporate enterprises during that period. The reforms initiated by the 
Government post 1991, have influenced the functioning and governance of Indian enterprises which has 
resulted in adoption of different growth and expansion strategies by the corporations. In that process, 
M&As have become a common phenomenon. M&As are not new in the Indian economy. In the past also, 
many companies have used this mechanism to grow and now Indian corporate enterprises are refocusing 
on the lines of core competence, market share, global competitiveness and consolidation. This process of 
refocusing has been further hastened by the arrival of foreign competitors.  
1.1. Indian Financial Services Sector 
The Indian financial industry underwent rapid transformation post liberalization in the early 90‟s, 
resulting in greater inflow of investments from FII's into the capital market. Despite the foray of foreign 
banks in the country, nationalized banks continue to be the biggest lenders in the country, primarily due 
to their size and penetration of networks. In fact, Industry estimates indicate that over 80% of commercial 
banks in India are in the public sector and of the 50-odd private banks, less than half are foreign banks. 
The Reserve Bank of India is the Indian equivalent of the Fed. The opportunities in this industry remain 
extremely promising due to its relatively low penetration of both basic as well as advanced financial 
products. 
Though the Indian finance and banking industry did suffer significantly during the past 2 years, it 
was relatively sheltered from the triggers of the global melt-down, suffering instead due to monies from 
FII‟s drying up, falling interest rates, rapidly rising inflation and poor investor confidence. Annual reports 
suggest that most of the larger Banks have begun to pick up from where they left off, albeit with more 
caution, and most industry pundits are optimistic about the current fiscal year. The financial services 
sector contributed 15 per cent to India's GDP in FY09, and is the second-largest component after trade, 
hotels, transport and communication all combined together, as per the Banking & Finance Journal, 
released by an industry body in August 2010.Share of Financial services, banking, insurance and real 
estate sectors is expected to enhance by 9.7 per cent for the year 2009-10 to 17.2 per cent of GDP (at 
factor cost). 
Data sourced from SEBI shows that the number of registered FIIs stood at 1,738 and number of 
registered sub-accounts rose to 5,592 as of November 10, 2010.Overseas funds infused into Indian capital 
market in 2010 stood at US$ 39 billion. According to data released by Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI), stocks and debt securities over worth US$ 17.28 billion were purchased by the foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs) from the Indian capital market in January 2011.According to data available 
with SEBI, FIIs have made investments worth US$ 4.11 billion in equities and invested US$ 667.71 
million into the debt market. The average assets under management of the mutual fund industry stood at 
US$ 147.99 billion for the quarter ended December 2010, according to the data released by Association 
of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI). 
 
As on January 21, 2011, India's foreign exchange reserves totaled US$ 299.39 billion, according 
to the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) Weekly Statistical Supplement. According to Venture Intelligence, a 
research firm, private equity firms invested US$ 7,974 million over 325 deals in India during 2010, as 
against US$ 4,068 million (over 290 deals) in 2009. The largest investment reported during the year was 
the US$ 425 million raised by power generation firm Asian Genco from investors including General 
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Atlantic, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Everstone and Norwest. According to a global consultancy 
firm Ernst & Young (E&Y), sectors such as power and transportation, consumer and branded products, 
infrastructure ancillaries, education and financial services, and healthcare are likely to witness increased 
PE activity in 2011. 
 
1.1.1. Deals 
India Inc announced merger and acquisition (M&A) deals worth a record US$ 55 billion in 2010, 
including a record number of billion-dollar transactions. The number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), 
private equity (PE) transactions and Qualified Institutional Placements (QIP) increased close to 40 per 
cent to US$ 3.23 billion in November 2010. Besides, there have been US$ 9 billion plus deals in 2010, 
the highest seen in any year. Fund-raising activity gained pace by almost 65 per cent in 2010 as compared 
to 2009. In real terms, 27 funds were able to raise US$ 13 billion as PE as against US$ 8 billion by 22 
funds in 2009. There has also been a more than 80 per cent growth in PE and VC investments in India: 
2010 witnessed 348 deals worth $8 billion, against 317 deals worth $4.4 billion in 2009, according to 
VCCedge data. 
TABLE 1.1: INVESTMENTS (TOP 10 DEALS, JAN – OCT 2010) 
Deal Date 
Announced 
total value 
(US$ million) 
Acquirer name Target name 
Outbound 22-Feb-10 200.00 Religare Enterprises Ltd Northgate Capital Group LLC 
Inbound 18-Feb-10 54.17 QInvest LLC Ambit Corporate Finance PteLtd 
Inbound 8-Jul-10 39.49 (Undisclosed Acquirer) 
Vijay Associates(Wadhwa) 
Constructions PvtLtd 
Domestic 8-Apr-10 38.76 
Tube Investments of India 
Ltd 
Cholamandalam DBS Finance 
Ltd 
Inbound 29-Jul-10 33.74 Investor Group Muthoot Finance Ltd 
Outbound 15-Mar-10 32.98 
Hindustan Construction Co 
Ltd 
Karl Steiner AG 
Domestic 30-Jun-10 30.47 Sundaram Finance Ltd 
Sundaram BNP Paribas Trustee 
Co Ltd 
Outbound 25-Oct-10 27.06 Farhat Developers Pvt Ltd 
Red Fort Capital Management 
Co LLC 
Domestic 5-Apr-10 26.58 Investor Group BhartiyaSamruddhi Finance Ltd 
Inbound 27-Mar-10 24.00 
ARIA Investment Partners 
III LP 
Equitas Micro Finance India Pvt 
Ltd 
Source: Thomson One Banker accessed on 8 November 2010, IBEF 
 
1.1.2. Stock Markets 
Capital market is one of the most important segments of the Indian financial system. It is the 
market available to the companies for meeting their requirements of the long-term funds. It refers to all 
the facilities and the institutional arrangements for borrowing and lending funds. In other words, it is 
concerned with the raising of money capital for purposes of making long-term investments. The market 
consists of a number of individuals and institutions (including the Government) that canalize the supply 
and demand for long -term capital and claims on it. The demand for long term capital comes 
predominantly from private sector manufacturing industries, agriculture sector, trade and the Government 
agencies, while the supply of funds for the capital market comes largely from individual and corporate 
savings, banks, insurance companies, specialized financing agencies and the surplus of Governments. 
Market capitalisation of India as a proportion of world market cap has risen to a record high. 
According to data sourced from Bloomberg, the country's market capitalisation as a proportion of the 
world market cap is currently 3.34 per cent. India's current market-cap is US$ 1.55 trillion as compared 
with world market-cap of US$ 46.5 trillion. This is higher than 3.12 per cent share India enjoyed at the 
market peak of January 2008.As analyzed by Venture Intelligence, private equity firms obtained exit 
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routes for their investments in a record 121 companies during 2010, including 24 via IPOs. (2009 had 
witnessed 66 liquidity events including 7 via IPOs). PE-backed companies raised about US$ 2.20 billion 
via IPOs during 2010. 
FIGURE 1.1: GROWTH IN MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF INDIAN 
COMPANIES
 
Source: NSE Factbook 2010 
 
According to ICICI Securities, Indian companies are likely to raise up to US$ 42.43 billion from 
the primary market over the next three years. According to MadhabiPuri-Buch, Managing Director and 
CEO, ICICI Securities' nearly US$ 20 billion will be raised from the initial public offer (IPO) market this 
fiscal (2010-11), of which around US$ 8.49 billion would be from the public sector and an equal amount 
from private companies. On the back of an increase in the participation of agriculture and other 
commodities, the 23 commodity exchanges posted 50 per cent year-on-year growth in turnover in the 
April-February period of 2009-10, to touch US$ 1.53 trillion, according to the commodity markets 
regulator, Forward Markets Commission (FMC). 
1.1.3. Banking 
Demand for banking services is growing significantly, albeit in a country where less than half of 
households have a bank account. It is in the retail sector that the surge in demand is most marked. 
Housing loans grew by more than 50% and loans to the retail commercial sector rose by more than 100%. 
According to the weekly statistical supplement (WSS) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Indian bank 
loans represented a rise of 19.1 per cent as of June 4, 2010 while deposits were up 14.3 per cent from the 
previous year. Furthermore, outstanding loans showed an increase from US$ 12.39 billion to US$ 703.5 
billion in the two weeks to June 4, 2010. The WSS reflected that bank deposits rose by US$ 3.24 billion 
to US$ 975 billion in the two weeks to June 4. In 2009, there were 21 IPOs that raised US$ 4.18 billion as 
compared to 36 IPOs in 2008 that raised US$ 3.62 billion. 
As per the statistics of RBI, aggregate deposits grew by 3.3% on q-o-q basis in quarter ended 
June 10 as against 5.1% during the same period last year; reflecting the relatively lower rates in term 
deposits. However, bank credit picked up by 5% (on q-o-q basis) during Q1FY11 as against 0.8% a year 
ago mainly owing to 3G and BWA auctions. As a result the CD ratio has improved from 71.5% on April 
9, 2010 to 73.44% on July 2, 2010. Base rate which was implemented from 1st July 2010 has not made 
much impact in the lending rates of the industry as RBI has signaled banks to increase the lending rates. 
Significantly, on a year-on-year basis, bank credit grew by 24.4 per cent in 2010 as against RBI‟s 
projections of 20 per cent for the entire fiscal 2010-11. 
 
With the increase in the short term rates and recent policy hikes, a number of banks during mid 
August have increased the lending (PLR) and deposit rates. Many banks have started mobilizing the 
CASA deposits at higher rates. However, we expect margins to sustain as loans get reprised faster than 
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deposits. Thus sustainable margins with upward bias, healthy credit demand and containment in the 
slippages and provisions will make Indian banking system stronger going forward. 
 
1.1.4. Insurance 
India is the 5th largest market in Asia by premium following Japan, Korea, China and Taiwan. In 
life insurance segment, India stands at fifth position in the emerging insurance economies globally and 
the segment is growing at a healthy 32-34 per cent annually, according to the Life Insurance Council. 
According to the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), total first year premium 
collected in 2009-10 was US$ 24.64 billion, an increase of 25.46 per cent over US$ 19.64 billion 
collected in 2008-09.Further, according to IRDA, in April 2010, life insurance companies collected first 
year premium worth US$ 1.29 billion, as compared to US$ 810.9 million in the corresponding period of 
2009. The life insurance industry grew by around 60 per cent in new business in the first half of 2010-11 
despite a slowdown in sales in September, according to data compiled by life insurance companies. 
 
In September, the industry grew by 20 per cent on a year-on-year basis collecting US$ 2.14 
billion in new business premium. However, the new business in September was almost 48 per cent lower 
than the previous month's collection. The life insurance industry is expected to cross the US$ 66.8 billion 
total premium income mark in 2010-11. "This year, we are expecting a growth of 18 per cent in total 
premium income. If achieved, it is expected to cross the US$ 64.4 billion mark," said SB Mathur, 
Secretary General, Life Insurance Council. Total premium income, at US$ 56.04 billion, rose 18 per cent 
during 2009-10, against US$ 47.6 billion in the previous year. In the fiscal year ending March 31, 2010, 
total premiums in India amounted to US$ 64.7 billion. This included non-life premiums of US$ 7.77 
billion and life premiums of US$ 56.9 billion. In the fiscal year ending March 31, 2015, the 
corresponding figures should be US$ 105.4 billion, US$ 14.6 billion and US$ 90.8 billion. In terms of the 
key drivers that underpin our forecasts, we are looking for non-life penetration to rise from 0.59% of 
GDP in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2010 to 0.61% in the March 2015 fiscal year. We expect that life 
density will rise from US$ 47 per capita to US$ 85 per capita. Taking the recent infrastructure related 
developments in consideration and the booming automobile industry in India as a parameter; we foresee 
the potential of the insurance sector in India. 
 
1.1.5. Industry Growth Potential 
The financial system of a country is of immense importance as it portrays the stability as well as 
sustainability of the country. The volume and growth of the capital in the country depends greatly upon 
the efficiency and intensity of the operations and activities in its financial markets. 
 
Demand for financial services in India is taking off rapidly. International financial institutions are 
playing an increasing role in the expansion of India's large corporations. A vast SME market remains 
largely untapped. As per the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), number of registered 
Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) as on May 31, 2010 was 1710 and the cumulative investments in 
equity since November 1992 to May 31, 2010, was US$ 77.2 billion, while the cumulative investments in 
debt during the same period were US$ 13.4 billion. The total FII inflow in equity during January to May 
2010 was US$ 4.6 billion while it was US$ 5.9 billion in debt. Net investment made by FIIs in equity 
between June 1, 2010 and June 14, 2010 was US$ 530.05 million while it was US$ 875.73 million in 
debt, as per the latest data released by SEBI.As on June 4, 2010, India's foreign exchange reserves totaled 
US$ 271 billion, an increase of US$ 9.87 billion over the same period last year, according to the Reserve 
Bank of India's Weekly Statistical Supplement. 
 
Private equity (PE) firms invested about US$ 2 billion across 56 deals during the quarter ended 
March 2010, according to a study by Venture Intelligence, a research service focused on M&A 
transaction activity in India. The amount invested during the January-March 2010 quarter was the highest 
in the last six quarters. The figure was significantly higher than that during the same period last year 
(January-March 2009) which witnessed US$ 620 million being invested across 58 deals and also the 
immediate previous quarter (October-December 2009) where investments worth US$ 1,681 million were 
made across 102 deals. Also, a study by Project Finance International (PFI), a source of global project 
finance intelligence and a Thomson Reuters publication has ranked India on top in the global project 
finance (PF) market in 2009, ahead of Australia, Spain and the US. The study said the main market for 
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PF in 2009 was the domestic Indian market, which raised US$ 30 billion, accounting for 21.5 per cent of 
the global PF market. This was up from US$ 19 billion in 2008. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A firm can achieve growth both internally and externally. Internal growth may be achieved if a 
firm expands its operations or up scales its capacities by establishing new units or by entering new 
markets. But internal growth may be faced by several challenges such as limited size of the existing 
market or obsolete product category or various government restrictions. Again firm may not have 
specialized knowledge to enter in to new product/ market and above all it takes a longer period to 
establish own units and yield positive return. In such cases, external mechanism of growth namely 
M&As, Takeovers or Joint Ventures may be utilized. Tambi (2005) attempts to evaluate the impact of 
such mergers on the performance of a corporation. Though the theoretical assumption says that mergers 
improve the overall performance of the company due to increased market power and synergy impacts, 
Tambi uses his paper to evaluate the same in the scenario of Indian economy. He has tested three 
parameters – PBITDA, PAT and ROCE - for any change in their before and after values by comparison 
of means using t-test. The results of his study indicate that mergers have failed to contribute positively to 
the set of companies chosen by him. 
 
Coming down to one of the most important but undermined reasons for merger and looking the 
after effects of a merger, Lev and Mandelker (1972) evaluate the reduction is risk of the acquiring firm. It 
is argued that unless returns of the parties involved in the merger are perfectly co-related, the variances of 
the combined firms‟ returns will be smaller than the weighted average of the variances of the returns of 
the individual firms – Diversification principle of portfolio theory. This may not be true for perfect 
capital markets, but as studies have shown that no market is fully efficient to reflect the true picture. They 
use five year pre and post-merger data to separately model the relationship between return on the stock 
price and return on the market to estimate β (a measure of systematic risk). The β value measures the 
sensitivity (responsiveness) of the stocks returns to economy wide fluctuations. The β so estimated is 
tested for change by comparison of means. They conclude by saying that mergers had no clear directional 
effect on the riskiness of the acquiring firms but also that β is based entirely on market data and maybe 
financial leverage may be a better indicator of financial risk of stockholders. 
 
Under the financial services sector in India, the banking sector specifically has seen a lot of 
M&A right from the early years. Historically, mergers and acquisitions activity started way back in 1920 
when the Imperial Bank of India was born when three presidency banks (Bank of Bengal, Bank of 
Bombay and Bank of Madras) were reorganized to form a single banking entity, which was subsequently 
known as State Bank of India. Ravichandran, Nor & Said (2010), in their paper, have tried to evaluate the 
efficiency and performance for selected public and private banks before and after the merger, as a result 
of market forces. After doing a factor analysis, they narrow down the variables for their study to Profit 
Margin, Current Ratio, Ratio of Advances to Total Assets, Cost Efficiency (ratio of cost to total assets) 
and Interest Cover and thereafter a regression is run to identify the relationship between these factors and 
return on shareholders‟ funds. The results indicate that cost efficiency, advances to total assets and 
interest cover are significant during both the pre and post-merger phases. Also the returns on 
shareholders‟ funds is negatively related to cost efficiency and interest cover but is positively related to 
ratio of advances to total assets. 
 
Just to look at the effects of M&A in another Indian industry, we consider the paper by Rani, 
Yadav and Jain (2008) where they examine the short run abnormal returns to India based mergers by 
using event study methodology. The short term effects are of interest because of the immediate trading 
opportunities that they create.  They start by discussing the present state of the Indian Pharmaceutical 
Industry and go on to explore some specific cases of acquisitions of foreign companies by Indian pharma 
majors. The calculate the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for foreign based 
acquisitions, mergers and Indian based acquisitions separately and conclude that abnormal returns are 
highest in case of foreign based acquisitions and lowest(negative) for India based mergers.  
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While going for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) management think of financial synergy and/or 
operating synergy in different ways. But are they actually able to generate any such potential synergy or 
not, is the important issue. Kumar &Bansal (2008), in their study, try to find out whether the claims made 
by the corporate sector while going for M&As to generate synergy, are being achieved or not in Indian 
context. They do so by studying the impact of M&As on the financial performance of the outcomes in the 
long run and compare and contrast the results of merger deals with acquisition deals. This empirical study 
is based on secondary financial data and tabulation. Ratio analysis and correlation are used for analysis. 
The results indicate that in many cases of M&As, the acquiring firms were able to generate synergy in 
long run, that may be in the form of higher cash flow, more business, diversification, cost cuttings etc. A 
limitation of their research is that it shows that management cannot take it for granted that synergy can be 
generated and profits can be increased simply by going for mergers and acquisitions. A case study based 
research parallel to this study could be initiated to get nearer to reality show. 
 
Anand& Singh (2008) study the effect of five specific mergers in the Indian banking sector on the 
shareholders wealth. These are mergers of the Times Bank with the HDFC Bank, the Bank of Madura 
with the ICICI Bank, the ICICI Ltd. with the ICICI Bank, the Global Trust Bank with the Oriental Bank 
of Commerce, and the Bank of Punjab with the Centurion Bank. The merger announcements in the have 
positive and significant shareholder wealth effect both for bidder and target banks. The market value 
weighted CAR of the combined bank portfolio as a result of merger announcement is 4.29 per cent in a 
three day period (-1, 1) window and 9.71 per cent in a 11-day period (-5, 5) event window. The findings 
of the study are in agreement with the European and the US bank mergers and acquisitions except for the 
fact that the value to the shareholders of bidder banks has been destroyed in the US context. 
 
Horizontal merger, another possible avenue of inorganic growth has also been a popular option of 
expansion amongst many companies in the financial services sector. It basically means a merger 
occurring between companies producing similar goods or offering similar services. Eckbo (1983) tests the 
hypothesis that horizontal mergers generate positive abnormal returns to stockholders of the bidder and 
target firms because they increase the probability of successful collusion among rival producers. Under 
this hypothesis, rivals of the merging firms benefit from the merger since successful collusion limits the 
output and raises product prices and/or lower factor prices. He found that the antitrust law enforcement 
agencies systematically select relatively profitable mergers for prosecution and there is little evidence 
indicating that the mergers would have had collusive, anticompetitive effects. 
 
Deregulation of the European financial services market during the 1990s led to an unprecedented 
wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the insurance industry. From 1990-2002 there were about 
2,595 M&As involving European insurers of which 1,669 resulted in a change in control. Cummins and 
Weiss (2004) in their paper investigate whether M&As in the European insurance market create value for 
shareholders by studying the stock price impact of M&A transactions on target and acquiring firms. The 
stock price effect of M&As is measured by looking at abnormal returns on the transaction event day and 
surrounding days, i.e., by measuring the stock price impact on target and acquiring firms beyond what is 
predicted using a market model of stock returns. They also examine cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) which accumulate the abnormal returns over event windows surrounding the M&A transaction 
dates. Their analysis shows that European M&As created small negative cumulative average abnormal 
returns CAARs) for acquirers (generally less than 1%) and substantial positive CAARs for targets (in the 
range of 12% to 15%). Cross-border transactions were value-neutral for acquirers, whereas within-border 
transactions led to significant value loss (approximately 2%) for acquirers. For targets, both cross-border 
and within-border transactions led to substantial value-creation. 
 
Bhaumik and Selarka (2008) discuss the impact of concentration of ownership on firm 
performance. On the one hand, concentration of ownership that, in turn, concentrates management control 
in the hands of a strategic investor, eliminates agency problems associated with dispersed ownership. On 
the other hand, it may lead to entrenchment of upper management which may be inconsistent with the 
objective of profit (or value) maximization. Their paper examines the impact of M&A on profitability of 
firms in India, where the corporate landscape is dominated by family-owned and group-affiliated 
businesses, such that alignment of management and ownership coexists with management entrenchment, 
and draws conclusions about the impact of concentrated ownership and entrenchment of owner managers 
on firm performance. Their results indicate that, during the 1995-2002 period, M&A in India led to 
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deterioration in firm performance. They also found that neither the investors in the equity market nor the 
debt holders can be relied upon to discipline errant (and entrenched) management. In other words, on 
balance, negative effects of entrenchment of owner manager strumps the positive effects of reduction in 
owner-vs.-manager agency problems. Their findings are consistent with bulk of the existing literature on 
family-owned and group affiliated firms in India. 
 
In today‟s globalized economy, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are being increasingly used the 
world over, for improving competitiveness of companies through gaining greater market share, 
broadening the portfolio to reduce business risk, for entering new markets and geographies, and 
capitalizing on economies of scale etc. Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) have studied the impact of mergers 
on the operating performance of acquiring corporates in different industries, by examining some pre- 
merger and post-merger financial ratios, with the sample of firms chosen as all mergers involving public 
limited and traded companies in India between 1991 and 2003. Their results suggest that there are minor 
variations in terms of impact on operating performance following mergers, in different industries in India. 
In particular, mergers seem to have had a slightly positive impact on profitability of firms in the banking 
and finance industry, the pharmaceuticals, textiles and electrical equipment sectors saw a marginal 
negative impact on operating performance (in terms of profitability and returns on investment). For the 
Chemicals and Agri-products sectors, mergers had caused a significant decline, both in terms of 
profitability margins and returns on investment and assets. 
 
A conglomerate merger generally leads, through the diversification effect, to reduced risk for the 
combined entity. As is well known, in perfect capital markets such risk reduction will not be beneficial to 
stockholders, since they can achieve on their own the preferred degree of risk in their "homemade" 
portfolios. What, then, is the motive for the widespread and persisting phenomenon of conglomerate 
mergers? Amihud and Bev (1981), study a "managerial" motive for conglomerate merger is advanced and 
tested. Specifically, managers, as opposed to investors, are hypothesized to engage in conglomerate 
mergers to decrease their largely undiversifiable "employment risk" (i.e., risk of losing job, professional 
reputation, etc.). Such risk-reduction activities are considered here as managerial perquisites in the 
context of the agency cost model. This hypothesis about conglomerate merger motivation is empirically 
examined in two different tests and found to be consistent with the data. 
 
The beginning of an M&A process increases the odds for an individual bank to become an 
acquisition target. The wave of M&A is rising without there being any reasons of economic performance 
to justify such action. Most bank employees regard M&A as a threat to their jobs, since shareholders 
often demand limitations in the number of employed staff. The scope of the study by Mylonakis (2006) is 
to examine the impact of this phenomenon on employment and on the efficiency of human resources. For 
the banks selected in this study, all strategies followed within the Hellenic banking sector are included: 
development through consecutive M&A (Eurobank, Piraeus Bank) development through selective 
acquisitions (Alpha Credit Bank), decreasing company size by selling of bank institutions (Emporiki 
Bank) and self-sustainable growth (National Bank of Greece). For the above five banks, data taken from 
published balance sheets for the 1998-2003 accounting periods have been used. Based on these data, 
indicators evaluating personnel efficiency have been calculated. M&A results in the Hellenic bank 
market have been negative in terms of employment, since 3,627 jobs have been cancelled during the 
1998-2003 period. These jobs belonged to banks that were either merged or acquired. Regarding a more 
efficient distribution of staff in the merged banks, data confirm that the large Greek banks that chose to 
grow through mergers have so far been justified in their choice. 
 
Merging or acquiring has been a tactical practice for companies in order to penetrate markets. As 
a means of foreign direct investment, it provides plenty of comparative advantages against competitors. 
The „early movers‟ phenomenon, as a special financial case of M&As is examined thoroughly in the 
paper by Kalimeris (2010). Specifically, it focuses on the stock prices‟ volatility of 109 merger-and-
acquisition cases of Greek companies in the period 1999-2006 that took place in the SE European region, 
as a part of the new merger wave. The methodology used in this paper is the Event Studies method, as 
used by Brown and Warner (1984). The model used in this research in order to calculate the abnormal 
returns is the Market Model, as noted above. A combination of the Market Model and the E-GARCH 
model is used to capture new information effects. For the majority of stock prices, there is a negative 
relationship between current return and future volatility. The fact that volatility tends to fall when returns 
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rise is in consonance with the leverage effect, The results show that in the majority of the sample there is 
appositive relationship between new information and conditional volatility, while in 37 cases the opposite 
holds. 
 
Ottaviani(2007) is his paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. He 
shows that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to the supply of 
deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market. We characterize the 
role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers and analyze the consequences of mergers on loan and 
deposit rates. When the value of diversification is sufficiently strong, bank mergers generate an increase 
in the welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, 
bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers. 
 
Examining the operating performance around commercial bank mergers, Cornett, McNutt and 
Tehranian (2006) conduct a study to evaluate the same. They find that industry-adjusted operating 
performance of merged banks increases significantly after the merger, large bank mergers produce 
greater performance gains than small bank mergers, activity focusing mergers produce greater 
performance gains than activity diversifying mergers, geographically focusing mergers produce greater 
performance gains than geographically diversifying mergers, and performance gains are larger after the 
implementation of nationwide banking in 1997. Further, they find improved performance is the result of 
both revenue enhancements and cost reduction activities. However, revenue enhancements are most 
significant in those mergers that also experience reduced costs. 
 
In more than 3,844 mergers and acquisitions between 1989 and 1999, acquiring institutions 
purchased more than $3 trillion in assets globally. A number of reasons have been advanced for such a 
surge in acquisitions, including the need to consolidate to achieve cost savings and operational 
efficiencies, to be better able to compete in the global marketplace, or to provide for the controlled exit of 
inefficient firms from the financial services industry. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) explore the question of 
whether the various expected performance and earning benefits of mergers are in fact realized. It adds to 
the limited existing research on the effects of bank mergers by analyzing consolidations between 1989 
and 1996, a period of almost unprecedented banking consolidation. Specifically, examining recent data 
allows considering evidence of efficiency or other gains from the wave of acquisitions flowing from the 
erosion and final elimination of the McFadden Act. Consistent with the findings of earlier studies, the 
results point to mixed efficiency and performance effects. Evidence suggests that even though the better-
performing institutions tended to target the higher-performing targets, the resulting mergers did not 
significantly improve profit performance or efficiency. In addition, the authors find only weak evidence 
that the market viewed acquisitions with favor. The overall conclusion is that the widely touted earnings, 
efficiency, and other performance and earning benefits of mergers of large banks still remain in doubt. 
 
3. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
A data set consisting of all mergers and acquisitions in the financial services sector, from 1993 to 
2010 has been chosen to perform the study. Financial services sector was chosen specifically as this 
sector has grown strongly over the past couple of decades and with license regime being abolished in 
1991, it has been a hotbed for M&A activity in the country. Data for 160 companies (that is 80 cases of 
M&A) has been collected for all the 18 years for the following parameters –  
 Profit Margin 
 Total Costs 
 Total Assets 
 Advances 
 Profit before Interest, Tax, Depreciation & Amortization (PBDITA) 
 Net Profit (PAT) 
 Current Ratio 
 Interest Cover (times) 
 Return on Capital Employed 
 Profit Margin 
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Firstly all the 80 companies that had undergone a merger or acquisition were listed and their 
acquirers companies were determined along with the year of merger/acquisition. Then the data for above 
parameters were collected for all the 160 companies for the entire period of 1993-2010. Few of these 
parameters were combined to form composite ratios also. All the data was collected using CMIE 
Prowess. The list of companies is provided in Table III in the Appendix. 
3.1. Model I 
The 3 year pre and post-merger data points were taken for all the parameters across the 80 cases. 
For pre-merger series, a simple average of the parameters‟ value for three years of both the target and the 
acquirer company is taken. For post-merger series, the average of the parameters‟ value for only the 
acquirer company is taken.  
1. Both the Pre and Post Merger Data Series were tested for normality using the Jarque Bera 
statistic.  
2. For those series where JB statistic was significant with a very high value, it was concluded that 
the series was not following a normal distribution. Therefore Wilcoxon Rank sum/Mann Whitney 
U Test was used to compare the means. 
3. For those cases where a normal distribution was being followed, Student t test for comparison of 
means from a single sample was used. 
3.2. Model II 
The following models have been estimated for the Pre and Post merger data – 
 
 
where: 
 = Return on Shareholder‟s funds before merger (proxied by ROCE) 
 Return on Shareholder‟s funds after merger (proxied by ROCE) 
= Profit Margin 
Current Ratio 
Cost Efficiency (Cost/Total Assets) 
IER = Interest Earning Ratio (Interest coverage times) 
 
The steps involved were – 
1. Each of the data series were tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test and 
made stationary (if not found) 
2. Above Model (regression) was estimated for the parameters using OLS Regression 
3. Significant parameters and their relationship with the dependent variable were determined. 
 
3.3. Model III 
Also the change in systematic risk will be measured as a change in the product of stocks β2with variance 
in market risk premium before and after the merger and will be regressed using the following model: 
 
 
where: 
Ri,t = Return on security i on day t 
Mt = Return on market on day t 
 
The daily returns for 90days pre and post-merger will be taken to calculate two values of 
βBM(before merger) and βAM(after merger).Then we measure the systematic risk in all the cases and then 
see for any significant change in systematic risk by a simple comparison of the pre and post merger cases.  
 
Systematic Risk (BM) =  
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Systematic Risk (AM) =  
A major outcome and reason for the M&A activity are the diversification benefits which allow 
for reduction in a company overall risk. To account for the same we estimate the proportion of systematic 
and non-systematic risk both before and after the merger for the acquiring firm and thereby use an F-Test 
to check whether the change is significant or not. The risk associated with any stock‟s return is directly 
related to the variance of returns on the stock. 
 
This model is estimated for a few selected cases–Merger of State Bank of Saurashtra with State 
Bank of India, merger of ICICI Bank with Bank of Madura and Merger of Athena Financial Services 
with Kinetic Capital Finance Limited. The reduction in systematic risk is measured for the acquiring 
entity (the entity remaining after the merger). 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The following are the results of the various test and models developed for the various cases of merger and 
their effects measured using different parameters. 
4.1. Effect of Mergers 
The following table depicts whether there is an improvement in the listed parameters for the various 
companies based on the comparison of three year pre and post-merger data in each of the cases. 
CR – Current Ratio IC – Interest Coverage  CE – Cost Efficiency (Cost/Total Assets) 
PM – Profit Margin ROCE – Return on Capital Employed 
TABLE 4.1: IMPROVEMENTS IN PARAMETERS 
COMPANY CR IC CE PAT ROCE PM PBDITA 
Chandrika Traders Ltd Y Y Y N Y - Y 
Joonktollee Tea &Inds. Ltd. N Y N Y N Y Y 
Asman Investments Ltd. Y N Y N N - N 
AdorTechnopak Ltd N N Y N N - N 
Alfa Laval (India) Ltd N Y Y Y Y - Y 
NiccoUco Alliance Credit Ltd Y N Y Y N - Y 
I C I C I Ltd N N N Y N - Y 
Apcotex Industries  Y N Y Y N Y N 
Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd N N Y N N - N 
Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd Y N Y N Y - N 
I C I C I Bank Ltd. - N N Y N - Y 
Bank Of Nova Scotia N Y N Y N - Y 
B F Utilities Ltd N N N N - - - 
T C S E-Serve Ltd N Y N Y Y - Y 
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. N N Y Y N - Y 
I C I C I Bank Ltd. N N N Y N - Y 
IC I C I Bank Ltd N N N Y N - Y 
H S B C Investdirect (India) Ltd. Y Y Y Y Y - Y 
 I C I C I Ltd.  N Y N Y Y - Y 
B F Utilities Ltd N N N N - - - 
BhartiAirtel Ltd. - N Y N N - Y 
Athena Financial Services Ltd N N Y Y - - - 
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. N N Y Y N - Y 
Saraswat Co-Operative Bank Ltd. N Y N Y N - Y 
Merrygold Investments Ltd Y N Y - - - - 
Monnet Ispat& Energy Ltd N N N - - Y - 
B F Utilities Ltd. N N N - - - - 
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Punjab National Bank N Y N Y Y - Y 
 Summit Securities Ltd N Y N - - - - 
Aura Securities Pvt. Ltd N N N - - N - 
Aditya Birla Money Ltd. N Y Y Y N - Y 
Asman Investments Ltd. N N N - - - - 
NiccoUco Alliance Credit Ltd. Y N N - - N - 
 Punjab National Bank Y Y N Y Y - Y 
Surabhi Chemicals & Investment Ltd N N N Y Y - Y 
 Bengal & Assam Co. Ltd N Y N Y Y Y Y 
Pidilite Industries Ltd. Y Y Y Y Y - Y 
Asman Investments Ltd N N Y N N - N 
Pioneer Investcorp Ltd. N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Duncans Industries Ltd. Y N Y N - - - 
Titan Industries  N N Y Y Y - Y 
Bengal & Assam Co. Ltd N Y N Y Y - Y 
Bank Of Rajasthan Ltd.  Y N N Y Y - Y 
Shree Capital Services Ltd. Y Y Y - - Y - 
Reliance Capital Ltd. N Y Y Y Y - Y 
Shaw Wallace Distilleries Ltd. N Y Y Y N - Y 
Indokem Ltd. N - N - - - - 
 I C I C I Ltd.  N N Y Y N - Y 
Tata Chemicals Ltd. Y Y Y Y N - Y 
Russell Credit Ltd. Y N N Y N - Y 
Asman Investments Ltd.  N N Y N N - N 
Stanrose Mafatlal Lubechem Ltd N N N N N - N 
Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd Y N Y N Y - N 
United Western Bank Ltd.  N N Y N N - Y 
Idea Cellular Ltd. N Y Y Y Y - Y 
Magma Fincorp Ltd. N N Y Y N - Y 
Mayuka Investment Ltd. Y N N Y N - Y 
 Bengal & Assam Co. Ltd N Y N Y Y - Y 
 Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. N N Y N N - N 
State Bank Of India N Y N Y Y - Y 
Kalyani Investment Co. Ltd N N N - - - - 
Lakshmi Trade Credits Ltd. Y N Y N N - Y 
Tata Finance Ltd.  Y N Y Y N - Y 
Apex Enterprises (India) Ltd. N N N Y N - Y 
Bengal & Assam Co. Ltd N Y N Y Y - Y 
H D F C Bank Ltd. N Y N Y Y - Y 
Indokem Ltd. N - N - - - - 
Vertex Securities Ltd. N N Y N N - Y 
Usha Martin Inds. Ltd.  N N N - - - - 
I D B I Bank Ltd. N N N N N - N 
Vadilal Industries Ltd. N N Y N N - N 
 Tata Investment Corpn. Ltd. Y Y N Y Y - Y 
Shaw Wallace Distilleries Ltd.  N Y Y Y N - Y 
Rujuvalika Investments Ltd. N N N - - - - 
Voltas Ltd. N N Y Y Y - Y 
Idea Cellular Ltd. N Y Y Y Y - Y 
Bengal & Assam Co. Ltd.  N Y N Y Y - Y 
Merrygold Investments Ltd. Y N Y - - - - 
 
Y: Yes, there has been an improvement 
N: No, there has not been an improvement (rather a decline) 
-: Cannot be determined (data insufficient)
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FIGURE 4.1: FREQUENCY PLOT FOR VARIOUS PARAMETERS FOR ACQUIRING COMPANIES 
 
 
From the above graph we can see that PBDITA and PAT have shown improvement in maximum number 
of cases whereas Current Ratio seems to have deteriorated post merger for the acquiring companies. Cost 
Efficiency has improved in nearly half the cases and deteriorated in the remaining half. 
 
4.2. Model I 
The following are the results for various parameters – 
TABLE 4.2: RESULTS FOR PRE-POST MERGER COMPARISON 
Parameter Pre/Post Series JB Statistic Wilcoxon/Mann Whitney 
Pre-Merger 5982.70 
1.8765 
Post-Merger 5082.70 
Pre-Merger 6002.56 
2.0123* 
Post-Merger 5681.45 
Pre-Merger 1796.68 
0.6247 
Post-Merger 9.27 
Pre-Merger 1130.91 
0.1722 
Post-Merger 7361.45 
Pre-Merger 18.86 
0.3922 
Post-Merger 19.17 
ADV/TA 
Pre-Merger 0.765 
1.0061 
Post-Merger 2.19 
CR 
Pre-Merger 609.11 
4.5899* 
Post-Merger 8131.51 
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
Note: For Profit Margin (PM) the numbers of data points were insufficient to give any conclusive results. 
From the results above, we can conclude that only Current Ratio (CR) and Profit before Interest, Tax, 
Depreciation& Amortization (PBDITA) have had a significant change from their pre-merger values while 
remaining parameters have not shown a significant change for the acquiring company.A comparison of 
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means indicates that on one side where PBDITA has improved post merger, Current Ratio on the other 
hand has deteriorated. (Refer Appendix Model I Results) 
4.3. Model II 
4.3.1. Pre-Merger 
All the dependent variables and the independent variable series were found to be stationary at Level using 
the ADF test. 
TABLE 4.3: PRE MERGER MODEL 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
-0.182358 -0.048757 0.9613 
0.156388 1.893913 0.0427* 
-0.025916 -0.274015 0.785 
 -2.137706 -0.232981 0.8165 
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
Note: For Profit Margin (PM) the numbers of data points were insufficient to be used in this regression model. 
 
Therefore we see that Interest Coverage is a significant variable affecting the return on shareholders‟ 
funds (ROSF) before the merger and is positively associated to the same indicating that an increase in 
interest coverage will allow for an increase in Return earned on shareholders‟ funds. 
 
4.3.2. Post-Merger 
All the dependent variables and the independent variable series were found to be stationary at Level using 
the ADF test. 
TABLE 4.4: POST MERGER MODEL 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
-0.982382 -0.263645 0.7936 
0.022824 2.546185 0.0136* 
0.040164 2.340353 0.0253* 
0.326509 0.260242 0.7962 
 4.669587 1.272021 0.212 
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
Hence we see that Interest Coverage continues to be a significant variable affecting the return on 
shareholders‟ funds (ROSF) even after the merger and is positively associated to the same indicating that 
there is no change in the relationship between ROSF and IC even after the merger. But we see that Profit 
Margin is also significant post the merger.  
 
4.4. Model III 
4.4.1. State Bank of India 
The date of merger of SBI with SBS is taken as the reference point. 90 days pre and post merger 
announcement data is taken to estimate the change in systematic risk. The results for the pre and post-
merger estimation of β are – 
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TABLE 4.5: SBI PRE-POST MERGER BETA ESTIMATION 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
0.000792 0.556514 0.5793 
0.972368 6.789262 0* 
0.99355
Systematic Risk (BM) = 0.9394  
 
0.002219 1.836094 0.0697 
1.217363 11.5422 0* 
1.3272
Systematic Risk (AM) = 1.9670  
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
From above table it can be seen that there has been an increase in the systematic risk for State Bank of 
India post its merger with State Bank of Saurashtra. Now we evaluate whether this increase is significant 
or not. 
Effect of Diversification 
Below is a figure representing the composition of total risk as systematic and non-systematic components 
for both before and after the merger periods. We see that both the systematic and non-systematic 
components have increased post the merger. 
 
FIGURE 4.2: SBI PRE-POST MERGER RISK COMPOSITION 
 
                     * Risk is measured as variance of returns 
 
To measure whether the above changes in Systematic and Non-Systematic Risk are significant, we 
conduct an F-test for total risk and the systematic risk components, the results for which are as tabulated 
in the table below – 
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TABLE 4.6: EFFECT OF DIVERSIFICATION ON RISK 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Value p-value 
 
1.19517 0.402 
 
1.335867 0.1739 
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
Thereby we see that the change in neither the Total Risk nor the Systematic Risk component is significant 
for State Bank of India. Hence this case of merger did not reap any benefits for State Bank of India which 
could be attributable to diversification effects of merger. 
 
4.4.2. ICICI Bank 
The date of merger of ICICI Bank Ltd with Bank of Madura is taken as the reference point. 90 days pre 
and post-merger announcement data is taken to estimate the change in systematic risk. The results for the 
pre and post-merger estimation of β are –  
 
TABLE 4.7:ICICI PRE-POST MERGER BETA ESTIMATION 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
1.007208 1.619621 0.1123 
1.816053 4.628941 0* 
2.5263
Systematic Risk (BM) = 8.3321  
-0.1591 -0.42526 0.6719 
0.730419 3.837213 0.0003* 
3.7608
Systematic Risk (AM) = 2.0065  
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
From above table it can be seen that there has been a decrease in the systematic risk for ICICI Bank post 
its merger with Bank of Madura. Now we evaluate whether this decrease is significant or not. 
Effect of Diversification 
Below is a figure representing the composition of total risk as systematic and non-systematic components 
for both before and after the merger periods. We see that both the systematic and non-systematic 
components have decreased post the merger. 
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FIGURE 2.3: ICICI PRE-POST MERGER RISK COMPOSITION 
 
                       * Risk is measured as variance of returns 
 
To measure whether the above changes in Systematic and Non-Systematic Risk are significant, we 
conduct an F-test for total risk and the systematic risk components, the results for which are as tabulated 
in the table below – 
 
TABLE 4.8: EFFECT OF DIVERSIFICATION ON RISK 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Value p-value 
 
1.432692 0.2265 
 
2.091126 0.0139* 
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
Thereby we see that the change in only the Systematic Risk component is significant for ICICI Bank 
whereas though there is a change in absolute value of Total Risk also, but the change is not significant. 
Also a comparison of variances shows that the Systematic Risk component has actually decreased after 
the merger, supporting the evidence for diversification effects of merger. 
 
4.4.3. Athena Financial Services 
The date of merger of Athena Financial Services with Kinetic Capital Finance Ltd is taken as the 
reference point. 90 days pre and post-merger announcement data is taken to estimate the change in 
systematic risk. The results for the pre and post-merger estimation of β are – 
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TABLE 4.9: ATHENA FINANCIAL SERVICES PRE-POST MERGER BETA ESTIMATION 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
-0.238214 -0.085449 0.9325 
1.847578 2.248608295 0.0272* 
2.9172
Systematic Risk (BM) = 9.9580  
POST MERGER PERIOD 
1.209026 0.81325 0.4186 
( 1.217896 2.5902375 0.0205* 
4.4820
Systematic Risk (AM) = 6.6482  
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
From above table it can be seen that there has been a decrease in the systematic risk for Athena Financial 
Services post its merger with Kinetic Capital Finance Ltd. Now we evaluate whether this decrease is 
significant or not. 
Effect of Diversification 
Below is a figure representing the composition of total risk as systematic and non-systematic components 
for both before and after the merger periods. We see that both the systematic and non-systematic 
components have decreased post the merger. 
FIGURE 4.4: ATHENA PRE-POST MERGER RISK COMPOSITION 
 
                     * Risk is measured as variance of returns 
 
To measure whether the above changes in Systematic and Non-Systematic Risk are significant, we 
conduct an F-test for total risk and the systematic risk components, the results for which are as tabulated 
in the table below – 
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TABLE 4.10: EFFECT OF DIVERSIFICATION ON RISK 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Value p-value 
 
2.027728 0.0495* 
 
2.638788 0.0075* 
* Significant at 95% level of confidence 
 
Thereby we see that the change in both Total Risk and the Systematic Risk component is significant for 
Athena Financial Services. Also a comparison of variances shows that Total Risk and the Systematic 
Risk components have actually decreased after the merger, supporting the evidence for diversification 
effects of merger. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
From the study conducted above we can conclude that the M&A activity in the Indian Financial 
Services Sector over a period of March 1993- Feb 2010 has had positive effects on the profitability in 
majority cases but the liquidity position has deteriorated in a period of  three years after the merger. This 
points to the fact that though companies may have been able to leverage the synergies arising out of the 
merger or acquisition, but they haven‟t been able to manage their capital structure to improve their 
liquidity.  
 
A comparison of the pre and post-merger performance of these companies indicates that though 
Interest Cover (EBIT/Interest) has remained a significant factor contributing to the return on 
shareholder‟s funds both before and after the merger, Profit Margin has a significant positive effect on the 
return only after the merger. Thus the ability of a company to service its debt obligations is an important 
factor affecting the companies‟ return irrespective of whether it is involved in a merger or not but it 
becomes important to generate higher profits after the merger in order to justify the decision of merger 
undertaken by the management to the shareholders. 
 
Finally looking at the three specific cases, we are able to highlight the importance of M&A as a 
means towards reduction of risk by diversification. We see that diversification not only helps reduce the 
non-systematic risk as part of the total risk, but also has an impact on the systematic risk component, 
thereby helping reduce the overall risk of the firm. 
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APPENDIX 
Model I Results 
Profit afterTax 
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Series: PAT_POST_MERGER
Sample 1 62
Observations 62
Mean       347.4491
Median   17.12583
Maximum  8338.800
Minimum -20.09667
Std. Dev.   1107.215
Skewness   6.248286
Kurtosis   45.26561
Jarque-Bera  5018.244
Probability  0.000000
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Mean       69.58272
Median   2.065000
Maximum  2111.810
Minimum -10.69667
Std. Dev.   277.0936
Skewness   6.668373
Kurtosis   49.23688
Jarque-Bera  5982.270
Probability  0.000000
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series
Date: 02/03/11   Time: 00:00
Sample: 1 62
Included observations: 62
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 1.876523 0.0606
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 1.876591 0.0606
Med. Chi-square 1 3.225806 0.0725
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 2.612903 0.106
Kruskal-Wallis 1 3.530722 0.0602
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 3.530978 0.0602
van der Waerden 1 2.477791 0.1155
Category Statistics
> Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
PAT_POST_MERGER 62 17.12583 36 68.56452 0.137825
PAT_PRE_MERGER 62 2.065 26 56.43548 -0.135772
All 124 4.535 62 62.5 0.001026
 
Profit before Interest, Tax, Depreciation & Amortization 
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Sample 1 62
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Mean       1986.816
Median   42.66000
Maximum  54362.76
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Std. Dev.   7165.184
Skewness   6.585660
Kurtosis   48.40753
Jarque-Bera  5681.457
Probability  0.000000
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Mean       436.5252
Median   23.79833
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Minimum -10.35833
Std. Dev.   1777.970
Skewness   6.732905
Kurtosis   49.69409
Jarque-Bera  6002.569
Probability  0.000000
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series
Date: 02/03/11   Time: 00:01
Sample: 1 62
Included observations: 62
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 2.012337 0.0442
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 2.012384 0.0442
Med. Chi-square 1 1.180645 0.2772
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 0.819892 0.3652
Kruskal-Wallis 1 4.059812 0.0439
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 4.06 0.0439
van der Waerden 1 3.785379 0.0517
Category Statistics
> Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
PBDITA_POST_MERGER 61 42.66 33 67.95082 0.171277
PBDITA_PRE_MERGER 61 23.79833 27 55.04918 -0.169741
All 122 30.9 60 61.5 0.000768
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Series: ROCE_PRE_MERGER
Sample 1 62
Observations 55
Mean       0.634848
Median   3.728333
Maximum  23.29500
Minimum -131.7583
Std. Dev.   21.23352
Skewness  -4.773406
Kurtosis   29.32236
Jarque-Bera  1796.685
Probability  0.000000
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series
Date: 02/03/11   Time: 00:02
Sample: 1 62
Included observations: 62
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 0.624716 0.5322
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 0.62475 0.5321
Med. Chi-square 1 0.036364 0.8488
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 0 1
Kruskal-Wallis 1 0.394014 0.5302
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 0.394056 0.5302
van der Waerden 1 0.8223 0.3645
Category Statistics
> Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
ROCE_POST_MERGER 55 3.82 28 57.40909 0.083745
ROCE_PRE_MERGER 55 3.728333 27 53.59091 -0.083583
All 110 3.7425 55 55.5 8.11E-05
 
Interest Coverage 
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Series: INTERESTCOVER_POSTMERGER
Sample 1 62
Observations 59
Mean       16.55446
Median   1.316667
Maximum  800.7300
Minimum -61.72000
Std. Dev.   104.4569
Skewness   7.347516
Kurtosis   55.71190
Jarque-Bera  7361.451
Probability  0.000000
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Series: INTERESTCOVER_PREMERGER
Sample 1 62
Observations 59
Mean       1.240424
Median   1.440000
Maximum  64.78500
Minimum -125.0000
Std. Dev.   21.35529
Skewness  -3.182438
Kurtosis   23.48226
Jarque-Bera  1130.918
Probability  0.000000
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series
Date: 02/28/11   Time: 23:21
Sample: 1 62
Included observations: 62
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 0.172233 0.8633
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 0.172248 0.8632
Med. Chi-square 1 0.033898 0.8539
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 0 1
Kruskal-Wallis 1 0.030598 0.8611
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 0.030604 0.8611
van der Waerden 1 0.108419 0.742
Category Statistics
> Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
INTERESTCOVER_POSTMERGER 59 1.316667 29 60.05085 0.029454
INTERESTCOVER_PREMERGER 59 1.44 30 58.94915 -0.029302
All 118 1.33 59 59.5 7.59E-05  
Cost Efficiency 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2
Series: COST_TA_POST
Sample 1 62
Observations 62
Mean       0.446062
Median   0.156788
Maximum  2.220044
Minimum  0.005201
Std. Dev.   0.538671
Skewness   1.313317
Kurtosis   3.723176
Jarque-Bera  19.17400
Probability  0.000069
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Series: COST_TA_PRE
Sample 1 62
Observations 62
Mean       0.294454
Median   0.161277
Maximum  1.292872
Minimum  0.003723
Std. Dev.   0.291968
Skewness   1.259124
Kurtosis   3.979590
Jarque-Bera  18.86136
Probability  0.000080
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series
Date: 02/28/11   Time: 23:28
Sample: 1 62
Included observations: 62
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 0.392296 0.6948
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 0.392309 0.6948
Med. Chi-square 1 0.129032 0.7194
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 0.032258 0.8575
Kruskal-Wallis 1 0.155863 0.693
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 0.155873 0.693
van der Waerden 1 0.513438 0.4737
Category Statistics
> Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
COST_TA_POST 62 0.156788 30 63.77419 0.062279
COST_TA_PRE 62 0.161277 32 61.22581 -0.062565
All 124 0.158297 62 62.5 -0.000143
 
Advances/Total Assets 
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Series: ADV_TA_POST
Sample 1 62
Observations 21
Mean       0.343865
Median   0.427930
Maximum  0.670108
Minimum  0.000134
Std. Dev.   0.251508
Skewness  -0.279555
Kurtosis   1.518505
Jarque-Bera  2.194001
Probability  0.333871
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Series: ADV_TA_PRE
Sample 1 62
Observations 21
Mean       0.263960
Median   0.224856
Maximum  0.703088
Minimum  0.001013
Std. Dev.   0.181320
Skewness   0.461858
Kurtosis   2.854076
Jarque-Bera  0.765228
Probability  0.682076
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series
Date: 02/28/11   Time: 23:30
Sample: 1 62
Included observations: 62
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 1.00623 0.3143
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 1.00623 0.3143
Med. Chi-square 1 0.857143 0.3545
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 0.380952 0.5371
Kruskal-Wallis 1 1.037969 0.3083
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 1.037969 0.3083
van der Waerden 1 0.555807 0.456
Category Statistics
> Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
ADV_TA_POST 21 0.42793 12 23.42857 0.107524
ADV_TA_PRE 21 0.224856 9 19.57143 -0.107524
All 42 0.323804 21 21.5 -6.34E-17
 
Current Ratio 
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Series: CURRENTRATIO_POST
Sample 1 62
Observations 60
Mean       18.48919
Median   1.318333
Maximum  1006.790
Minimum  0.096667
Std. Dev.   129.7628
Skewness   7.548939
Kurtosis   57.99690
Jarque-Bera  8131.512
Probability  0.000000
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Series: CURRENTRATIO_PRE
Sample 1 62
Observations 60
Mean       11.20700
Median   2.453333
Maximum  150.9308
Minimum  0.050000
Std. Dev.   28.09357
Skewness   3.773636
Kurtosis   16.66320
Jarque-Bera  609.1110
Probability  0.000000
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Test for Equality of Medians Between Series
Date: 02/28/11   Time: 23:35
Sample: 1 62
Included observations: 62
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 4.589935 0
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 4.590118 0
Med. Chi-square 1 26.13333 0
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 24.3 0
Kruskal-Wallis 1 21.0916 0
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 21.09328 0
van der Waerden 1 17.03157 0
Category Statistics
> Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score
CURRENTRATIO_PRE 60 2.453333 44 75.08333 0.365413
CURRENTRATIO_POST 60 1.318333 16 45.91667 -0.365275
All 120 1.711667 60 60.5 6.94E-05
 
Model II Results 
Pre Merger 
Dependent Variable: PRE_ROCE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/01/11   Time: 00:43
Sample: 1 66
Included observations: 66
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.182358 3.740139 -0.048757 0.9613
PRE_INTERESTCOVER 0.156388 0.082574 1.893913 0.0427
PRE_CURRENTRATIO -0.025916 0.09458 -0.274015 0.785
PRE_COSTTA -2.137706 9.17544 -0.232981 0.8165
R-squared 0.027065     Mean dependent var -0.550694
Adjusted R-squared -0.020012     S.D. dependent var 20.29206
S.E. of regression 20.4941     Akaike info criterion 8.936843
Sum squared resid 26040.51     Schwarz criterion 9.069549
Log likelihood -290.9158     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.989282
F-statistic 0.574911     Durbin-Watson stat 1.486111
Prob(F-statistic) 0.633654
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Post Merger 
Dependent Variable: POST_ROCE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/01/11   Time: 00:15
Sample: 1 39
Included observations: 39
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.982382 3.726149 -0.263645 0.7936
POST_PROFITMARGIN 0.022824 0.008964 2.546185 0.01365
POST_INTERESTCOVER 0.040164 0.017162 2.340353 0.0253
POST_CURRENTRATIO 0.326509 1.254638 0.260242 0.7962
POST_COSTTA 4.669587 3.670999 1.272021 0.212
R-squared 0.252214     Mean dependent var 3.387179
Adjusted R-squared 0.164239     S.D. dependent var 14.61419
S.E. of regression 13.36028     Akaike info criterion 8.141659
Sum squared resid 6068.905     Schwarz criterion 8.354936
Log likelihood -153.7624     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.218181
F-statistic 2.86689     Durbin-Watson stat 1.945843
Prob(F-statistic) 0.037799
 
Model III Results 
State Bank of India 
Stationarity
Null Hypothesis: SBI_PRE has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=11)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.14041 0
Test critical values: 1% level -3.5056
5% level -2.89433
10% level -2.58433
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Page | 30 
 
Null Hypothesis: SBI_POST has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=11)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.28424 0
Test critical values: 1% level -3.5056
5% level -2.89433
10% level -2.58433
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Pre merger 
Dependent Variable: SBI_PRE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/10/11   Time: 22:03
Sample: 1 90
Included observations: 90
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.000792 0.001424 0.556514 0.5793
MKT_PRE 0.972368 0.143221 6.789262 0
R-squared 0.343744     Mean dependent var 5.31E-05
Adjusted R-squared 0.336287     S.D. dependent var 0.016531
S.E. of regression 0.013468     Akaike info criterion -5.755048
Sum squared resid 0.015962     Schwarz criterion -5.699497
Log likelihood 260.9772     Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.732647
F-statistic 46.09409     Durbin-Watson stat 2.145322
Prob(F-statistic) 0  
Post merger 
Dependent Variable: SBI_POST
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/10/11   Time: 22:04
Sample: 1 90
Included observations: 90
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.002219 0.001208 1.836094 0.0697
MKT_POST 1.217363 0.105471 11.5422 0
R-squared 0.60221     Mean dependent var 0.002042
Adjusted R-squared 0.59769     S.D. dependent var 0.018073
S.E. of regression 0.011463     Akaike info criterion -6.077386
Sum squared resid 0.011564     Schwarz criterion -6.021835
Log likelihood 275.4824     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.054985
F-statistic 133.2224     Durbin-Watson stat 1.926282
Prob(F-statistic) 0
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Diversification Effect of Merger 
Test for Equality of Variances Between Series
Date: 03/13/11   Time: 12:23
Sample: 1 90
Included observations: 90
Method df Value Probability
F-test (89, 89) 1.19517 0.402
Siegel-Tukey 1.414735 0.1571
Bartlett 1 0.702377 0.402
Levene (1, 178) 1.076282 0.3009
Brown-Forsythe (1, 178) 1.13919 0.2873
Category Statistics
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey-
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank
SBI_POST 90 0.018073 0.014439 0.014418 85
SBI_PRE 90 0.016531 0.012805 0.012707 96
All 180 0.0173 0.013622 0.013563 90.5
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.017319  
Test for Equality of Variances Between Series
Date: 03/13/11   Time: 12:24
Sample: 1 90
Included observations: 90
Method df Value Probability
F-test (89, 89) 1.335867 0.1739
Siegel-Tukey 0.962706 0.3357
Bartlett 1 1.848944 0.1739
Levene (1, 178) 1.191603 0.2765
Brown-Forsythe (1, 178) 1.071878 0.3019
Category Statistics
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey-
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank
MKT_POST 90 0.011521 0.008942 0.008861 86.75556
MKT_PRE 90 0.009968 0.007858 0.007804 94.24444
All 180 0.010747 0.0084 0.008332 90.5
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.010772  
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ICICI Bank Ltd. 
Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: ICICI_PRE has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.12641 0
Test critical values: 1% level -3.58115
5% level -2.92662
10% level -2.60142
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Null Hypothesis: ICICI_POST has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=11)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.11595 0
Test critical values: 1% level -3.51905
5% level -2.90014
10% level -2.58741
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
Pre merger 
Dependent Variable: ICICI_PRE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/11/11   Time: 13:39
Sample: 1 47
Included observations: 47
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.007208 0.621879 1.619621 0.1123
MKT_PRE 1.816053 0.392326 4.628941 0
R-squared 0.322566     Mean dependent var 0.644255
Adjusted R-squared 0.307511     S.D. dependent var 5.082399
S.E. of regression 4.229364     Akaike info criterion 5.763601
Sum squared resid 804.9382     Schwarz criterion 5.842331
Log likelihood -133.445     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.793228
F-statistic 21.4271     Durbin-Watson stat 1.85726
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000031  
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Post merger 
Dependent Variable: ICICI_POST
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/11/11   Time: 13:40
Sample: 1 77
Included observations: 77
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.1591 0.374125 -0.42526 0.6719
MKT_POST 0.730419 0.190352 3.837213 0.0003
R-squared 0.164105     Mean dependent var -0.442857
Adjusted R-squared 0.15296     S.D. dependent var 3.496683
S.E. of regression 3.218165     Akaike info criterion 5.20113
Sum squared resid 776.7438     Schwarz criterion 5.262008
Log likelihood -198.244     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.225481
F-statistic 14.7242     Durbin-Watson stat 2.100719
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000258
 
 
Diversification Effect of Merger 
Test for Equality of Variances Between Series
Date: 03/13/11   Time: 11:11
Sample (adjusted): 1 47
Included observations: 47 after adjustments
Method df Value Probability
F-test (46, 46) 1.432692 0.2265
Siegel-Tukey 0.737296 0.4609
Bartlett 1 1.462879 0.2265
Levene (1, 92) 0.658652 0.4191
Brown-Forsythe (1, 92) 0.56191 0.4554
Category Statistics
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey-
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.Siegel Rank
ICICI_POST 47 4.24612 3.046908 3.044681 49.58511
ICICI_PRE 47 5.082399 3.591879 3.555319 45.41489
All 94 4.691558 3.319393 3.3 47.5
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  4.682965  
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Test for Equality of Variances Between Series
Date: 03/13/11   Time: 11:12
Sample (adjusted): 1 47
Included observations: 47 after adjustments
Method df Value Probability
F-test (46, 46) 2.091126 0.0139
Siegel-Tukey 1.491014 0.136
Bartlett 1 6.055571 0.0139
Levene (1, 92) 4.355918 0.0396
Brown-Forsythe (1, 92) 4.183113 0.0437
Category Statistics
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey-
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.Siegel Rank
MKT_POST 47 2.298472 1.732947 1.715106 43.29433
MKT_PRE 47 1.589459 1.177981 1.155745 51.70567
All 94 1.966988 1.455464 1.435426 47.5
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  1.976026  
 
Athena Financial Services 
Stationarity 
Null Hypothesis: ATHENA_PRE has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=8)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.91103 0
Test critical values: 1% level -3.65373
5% level -2.95711
10% level -2.61743
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Null Hypothesis: ATHENA_POST has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=11)
t-Statistic   Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -13.9008 0.0001
Test critical values: 1% level -3.5056
5% level -2.89433
10% level -2.58433
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Pre merger 
Dependent Variable: ATHENA_PRE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/11/11   Time: 14:11
Sample: 1 33
Included observations: 33
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.238214 2.787788 -0.085449 0.9325
MKT_PRE 1.847578 0.821654 2.2486083 0.0272
R-squared 0.038781     Mean dependent var 0.014848
Adjusted R-squared 0.007774     S.D. dependent var 16.02419
S.E. of regression 15.96178     Akaike info criterion 8.436963
Sum squared resid 7898.129     Schwarz criterion 8.52766
Log likelihood -137.2099     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.46748
F-statistic 1.250719     Durbin-Watson stat 2.524884
Prob(F-statistic) 0.272007  
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Post merger 
Dependent Variable: ATHENA_POST
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/11/11   Time: 14:11
Sample: 1 77
Included observations: 77
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.209026 1.48666 0.81325 0.4186
MKT_POST 1.217896 0.470187 2.5902375 0.0205
R-squared 0.005157     Mean dependent var 1.250779
Adjusted R-squared -0.008107     S.D. dependent var 12.97964
S.E. of regression 13.03215     Akaike info criterion 7.998346
Sum squared resid 12737.77     Schwarz criterion 8.059224
Log likelihood -305.9363     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.022697
F-statistic 0.388817     Durbin-Watson stat 2.774491
Prob(F-statistic) 0.534814  
 
Diversification Effect of Merger 
Test for Equality of Variances Between Series
Date: 03/12/11   Time: 22:49
Sample (adjusted): 1 33
Included observations: 33 after adjustments
Method df Value Probability
F-test (32, 32) 2.027728 0.0495
Siegel-Tukey 1.617261 0.1058
Bartlett 1 3.857006 0.0495
Levene (1, 64) 3.659378 0.0602
Brown-Forsythe (1, 64) 3.376688 0.0708
Category Statistics
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey-
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank
ATHENA_POST 33 11.25307 8.335813 8.322121 37.33535
ATHENA_PRE 33 16.02419 12.44259 12.33182 29.66465
All 66 13.74053 10.3892 10.32697 33.5
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  13.84569  
 
